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THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR EXPROPRIATED
FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY BETWEEN CUBA AND
FOREIGN NATIONS OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES

MICHAEL W. GORDON*

A study of the political, economic and legal relationships between the
United States and Cuba subsequent to the revolution suggests an intransi.
gence by Cuba in recognizing any property rights by foreigners, a view
which may lead to the incorrect conclusion that Cuba has been entirely
unwilling to settle any foreign claims. Cuba has concluded formal settlement agreements with France, Spain and Switzerland, all in 1967, and
was expected to commence discussions with the Canadian government in
mid-1973.
The continuing refusal of the Cuban government to disclose information about its claims negotiations and settlements with both foreign
nations and individual claimants precludes all but a very brief discussion
of this area. It is an important aspect of the post-revolution foreign policy
of Cuba, however, and even a limited study allows several interesting
observations which may provide some insight regarding the type of
approach Cuba may utilize in any ultimate claims settlement negotiations
with the United States. Actually, a release of claims information by Cuba
could inure to the nation's benefit since it would confirm a willingness of
the Cuban government to deal realistically with capital exporting nations
when Cuba decides to achieve a more flexible trade pattern.' In addition
to re-establishing markets, the settlements have allowed Cuba to diversify
its trade in the non-socialist world and to a very small degree lessen the
nation's dependence on the Soviet Union.
Claims agreements between Cuba and both France and Switzerland
have been made available for study as public documents by the latter
nations and, consequently, some interpretation is possible as to the form
of agreement acceptable to Cuba in settling claims. Although there has
also been an agreement consummated with Spain, it has not been disclosed
by the Spanish government.2 Any agreement reached with Canada, how*Professor of Law and Director, Mexican Summer Law Program, The University
of Florida College of Law.
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ever, is likely to be made available upon its execution. The expected negotiations between Cuba and Canada will presumably seek to achieve a
settlement of all outstanding claims. The agreement will have no effect on
the two nationalized Canadian banks, the Bank of Nova Scotia and the
Royal Bank of Canada, which reached individual settlements soon after
their properties had been taken.
Subsequent to several initial expropriations of property by the Cuban
government in 1959-1960, the proceeds of bank accounts of the Cuban
government maintained in United States banks were transferred to banks
in Canada.' The transfer was not halted until the passage of the Cuban
Assets Control legislation which precluded further removal of any assets
of the Cuban government from the United States.4 By the earlier removal
of the bank deposits to Canada, however, Cuba was provided with a
source of foreign exchange allowing settlements with the two Canadian
banks which had maintained branches in Cuba. 5 Negotiations with the
Cuban government for the claims of other Canadian property owners were
not considered possible until recently. On January 14, 1971, the Canadian
Department of External Affairs announced that the Canadian and Cuban
governments had agreed to commence discussions with a view to reaching
a lump sum settlement for claims of Canadian citizens.6 Simultaneously,
the Canadian government announced that Canadian citizens should file
details of their claims with the department prior to June 15, 1971. 7 An
undisclosed amount of claims was submitted and viewed by the department.8 In May of 1972, the claims accepted by the department were presented to the Banco Nacional de Cuba in Havana for its consideration, 9
with discussion of the claims, and a possible settlement agreement, anticipated during 1973."'
Canadian investment in Cuba at the time of the revolution and
recent trade statistics suggest some motivation for a Canadian accord.
Canadian investment in Cuba in 1956 was estimated to be $9.4 million
with $8.8 million of that aggregate owned by the Canadian banks.'1 It
would seem apparent that the comparatively low total investment in Cuba,
particularly considering some resolution already completed with the banks,
would increase the feasibility of a settlement, in contrast to nations with
large outstanding claims. The incentive to achieve a settlement would be
to encourage Canada to become a more important trading partner than
it has been during the last decade. In 1960 and 1961 trade with Canada
was at levels of 25.9 and 39.6 million pesos, respectively. 12 Trade decreased
to 14.6 million pesos in 1962, then fluctuated between 20 and 45 million
pesos from 1963 to 1965, before declining significantly in 1966 and 1967

SETTLEMENT

OF FOREIGN

CLAIMS:

CUBA

to only 10.9 and 14 million pesos.13 The willingness to negotiate a claims
settlement with Canada may reflect this trade loss and a Cuban government desire to settle the claims issue as an expected impetus to renewed
trade.
Well before any negotiations were begun with Canada, Cuba entered
into the accords with France, Spain and Switzerland. The agreement
between Cuba and Spain, executed in 1967, has not been disclosed to the
public. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid has stated that the
agreement itself prohibited the public disclosure of its terms without the
permission of both parties; only information of need to claimants may be
released. 14 While the Spanish accord provided for some form of compensation, recent discussions in Spain with several Madrid attorneys evidenced
their belief that payments had not yet been forthcoming from Cuba, some
six years after the accord was signed.
Trade statistics of Cuba and Spain support a view that Cuba might
have accepted a resolution with Spain which allowed for a larger pro-rata
settlement of claims of Spanish claimants than under the French or Swiss
accords. While Spain's trade with Cuba in 1960 was, at 20.8 million pesos,
less than trade with Canada, France, Japan and the United Kingdom, by
1963 Spain had become the major non-socialist trading partner of Cuba."
Trade increased slowly at first, approximately doubling in 1963 from the
1961 statistics. In 1964, however, Spain's trade with Cuba amounted to
107.1 billion pesos, a threefold increase over the previous year. Since then
the amount of trade with Spain has fluctuated but Spain has continued
to hold the lead in trade with Cuba among the non-socialist nations. 1" It is
unlikely that Cuba could have agreed to a settlement of claims with France
and Switzerland, both less significant trading partners, without reaching
an accord with Spain. The non-disclosure of the agreement with Spain
may evidence that Cuba had to settle for a larger payment than it wished
to have disclosed to the public. Whether these observations are correct can
only be judged at a future time when the Spanish accord has been disclosed
to the public and when additional information is made available which will
establish the proportional relationship of the settlement amounts to the
total claims valuations filed in each nation.
The Spanish settlement in 1967 was executed in the same month as
the agreements with both France and Switzerland. Indeed, all were signed
in March within fourteen days of one another. The Cuban government
apparently had been unwilling to even discuss the matter of compensation
for the nationalizations of the property of any of the countries until late
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1966.17 The thaw which did occur in late 1966, leading to the accords
with the three nations, does not suggest in the case of the Swiss agreement
that the thaw was particularly extensive. Cuba reached a favorable resolution with Switzerland by establishing a market for 40,000 tons of Cuban
sugar annually for eight years, while avoiding a requirement that the
Cuban government pay any definite lump sum settlement for the outstanding claim of individuals and insurance companies. France, contrastingly,
obtained a lump sum for the payment of all claims, not limited to specific
companies as in the Swiss accord.' 8 The French accord appears to be far
more favorable to France than the Swiss accord to Switzerland, although
it is impossible to determine the relative percentages which the agreed
upon payments represent in proportion to the total claims of the nationals
of each country.
The Swiss accord is conclusive only with respect to three Swiss owned
Cuban food processing enterprises, 19 all of which were nationalized by
Cuban law 890 on October 13, 1960.20 The agreed upon settlement of
18,039,000 Swiss francs was for indemnification of the nationalization of
the enterprises themselves, the payment of fees due to the entities prior to
nationalization and for the unauthorized use of brand names by the Cuban
government following the nationalizations3' The Swiss agreed to an eight
year quarterly payment schedule, with 1,752,360 Swiss francs due each
of the first three years, followed by five years of annual payments of
2,555,525 Swiss francs. 22 The stated annual payments would be supple.
mented by additional amounts in the event that further agreements were
reached resolving the claims of individuals and insurance companies.
The method of payment under the Swiss accord illustrates the practicalities involved in achieving any settlement with Cuba except where the
Cuban need to reach a settlement is so severe as to eliminate any bargaining power. That need has not been apparent, with the unlikely exception
of the undisclosed accord with Spain. The Swiss accord illustrates the
absence of any bargaining weakness on the part of Cuba. The Swiss government specifically commented that Cuba's lack of foreign currency
precluded the possibility of compensation by direct cash payments.2 3 The
Cuban government, however, was not willing to apply all of the currency
received from the sale of sugar to Switzerland to the settlement amount,
it rather insisted that the Swiss accept substantially more than an amount
of sugar which would represent the annual indemnification payment at
world sugar prices. After what the Swiss government described as "bitter
discussions" the issue was resolved with the Swiss interests agreeing to buy
an annual total of 40,000 tons of sugar at the world price; approximately
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one third of the hard currency Cuba was to receive for the sale would serve
as an indemnity. 24 The Swiss purchasers did reserve the right to utilize
the sugar in either Switzerland or other international markets, and both
parties agreed to discuss the possible substitution of coffee or molasses for
sugar. 25 The accord further agreed that the total indemnity might be amortized more rapidly during the last four years of the eight year agreement
duration by applying twenty percent of the value of purchases of Cuban
coffee, not substituted for sugar, to the indemnification balance.
Recognizing foreseeable problems of delivery of the sugar by Cuba,
presumably due to unstable climatic conditions or perhaps even to higher
priority commitments to the Soviet bloc, the accord provided that the
contractual obligations would extend beyond the eight year period until
full compensation had been made. The Swiss interests would not be com26
mitted to purchasing more than 40,000 tons annually, although the purchases might extend beyond the eight years in the event of presumably
27
unavoidable Cuban delays.
The uniqueness of the Swiss accord is partially attributable to the
food processing nature of the expropriated Swiss owned companies and
the ability of the parent Swiss companies to utilize or resell Cuban sugar
and, possibly coffee and molasses. The agreement is indeed realistic; it
amounts essentially to a government negotiated settlement for three private
firms based primarily on the capacity of those firms, rather than the Swiss
government, to absorb Cuban sugar and other agricultural commodities
of a sufficient quantity so that Cuba would be allowed to obtain needed
foreign exchange, while returning only a portion of that exchange as
indemnification. The willingness of the Cuban government to pay one third
of the sugar receipts as indemnification is substantially more than its
proposal for indemnification contained in the June 6, 1960 nationalization
law which expropriated United States investor owned private property,
that law limited the indemnification to an unrealistic fund created from
25 percent of the excess of sugar purchases above a base of three million
tons at a subsidized price.2 8 Were the Swiss companies unable to utilize or
resell the sugar, it is quite possible that no agreement would have been
reached with the Swiss since the Swiss possess few commodities currently
29
needed by the Cuban economy.
The Swiss
of individuals.
industries had
to the Cuban

accord additionally provides some form for resolving claims
Claims valuation of the three nationalized food processing
been previously accomplished in Switzerland, apparently
government's satisfaction. The Cubans demanded further
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evidence of the claims of expropriated individuals and the insurance companies, however, even though the Swiss Department of Politics had
attempted to evaluate the claims of all persons referred to them by various
30
means, although without a formal announcement of a claims program.
The lack of a more formal claims program to preadjudicate claims may
have resulted in the participation by the Cuban government in approving
individual claims. Under the accord, the value of the indemnities of individuals would be determined by mutual agreement after documents
requested by the Cuban authorities had been furnished. Thus, the resolution of the claims of the three food processing firms by apparent acceptance of a predetermined claims method was to be followed by more of an
informal mixed claims commission format for the remaining claims of
individuals and the insurance companies. It is likely that one of the major
reasons for this difference is the inability of the latter group to absorb
some of Cuba's agricultural production. The willingness and ability evidenced by the three food processing concerns to accept sugar undoubtedly
resulted in their receiving a great percentage of their claims than would
have been the case had they, like the individual claimants, been interested
solely in receiving cash indemnification.
The final settlements for the individual and insurance claims was to
be added to the aggregated indemnification in article I of the accord and
would therefore "benefit also from the means of transfer set forth in the
present agreement as well as by the commercial contracts which will aid
in its execution."'" What is not clear is whether the determination of
individual and insurance company claims would place an additional burden
on the Swiss interests to increase purchased quantities of sugar. The
answer seems to be no. Article 3 of the agreement states that the obligation
of the Swiss interests is the purchase of 40,000 tons of sugar; there is no
suggestion of any additional amount contingent upon the resolution of
claims of individuals under article 4. While it is unreasonable to expect
the nationalized food processing companies to purchase additional sugar,
the Swiss government could well assume that burden if the quantity is
reasonable and predictably disposable. Additional purchases could either
add to the annual 40,000 ton commitment or extend the agreement beyond
eight years. The allocation of the indemnities paid to the Swiss govern32
ment is reserved by the latter nation, although it would appear that the
mutual determination of claims under article 4 might set the value of each
individual claim.
Soon after the signing of the agreement, the Swiss government published notices in both the Federal Paper and the Ojjicial Swiss Paper o/
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Commerce, informing Swiss national claimants who were not then known
to the Swiss government to file their claims.3 3 The nationals were given
approximately two months to file their claims with the Federal Political
Department of the Swiss government. Detailed information was requested,
the data then to be utilized in the mutual resolution of the claims with
Cuba.
The Swiss accord could only have been reached with the realism
evidenced by the Swiss government, including a direct trade agreement
as part of the settlement. The unique nature of the companies involved
allowed such a resolution, although the absence of a preadjudication of
claims may in the long run prove to have been disadvantageous for those
individuals and insurance companies which under the accord are subjected to a mutual determination of the validity of their claims. While
any ultimate resolution with the United States may be similar, i.e., Cuba
may either agree to pay a certain percentage of preadjudicated claims, or,
although extremely unlikely, participate in a predetermination of those
claims and bargain the claim value down to a similar percentage. The
distribution of the funds to claimants would not be identical under each
method, however. Had the Swiss government provided for a thoroughly
documented preadjudication of the claims, it might well have been able
to have included the individual and insurance company claims in the
original accord, without the necessity of the continuation of what the
Swiss government itself labeled as "difficult" and occasionally "bitter"
discussions. Preadjudication is not a requirement to a lump sum settlement
which does not contain a direct trade agreement; indeed, the French
accord provided for a lump sum settlement with no direct trade agreement
involved and with the continuation of French claims practice which does
not utilize preadjudication procedures. 34 It does seem, however, that preadjudication provides a better bargaining base than the rather sketchy
procedures followed by the Swiss government.
The French-Cuban accord, executed in Havana on March 16, 1967,
14 days after that with Switzerland and two days after the undisclosed
agreement with Spain, is in marked contrast to the Swiss agreement in
that the French accord does not include a direct trade agreement. 35 The
motivation for the agreement was undoubtedly partially attributed to a
desire for increased trade with France. The execution of the settlement
agreements with France, Spain and Switzerland all within the same
two weeks suggests a similar Cuban motivation for resolving the claim,
of each of these nations. Judged by examining the agreement with
Switzerland, the motivation for each agreement was likely the desire to
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maintain or develop trade relationships. The pattern of trade with France
prior to the agreement and during 1967, supports the view that trade did
increase after the agreement, even though there was no trade requirements
in the agreement. The trade was probably the outgrowth of ancillary oral
understandings.
Trade with France decreased significantly from 21.5 million pesos in
1960 to 8.4 million in 1961 and 2.9 million in 1962. 36 France was indeed
one of the problem countries for Cuba's trade sector after the revolution.
Trade with Canada, Japan, Mexico and the United Kingdom did not
decrease as substantially as that with France, or even increased during
the same period. 37 Spanish-Cuban trade also decreased abruptly, although
it then began to increase to much higher levels than previously, an
increase which Cuba certainly wanted to maintain.3 8 After reaching the
1962 low, Cuban trade with France increased in 1963 to 8.4 million pesos,
in 1964 to 21.6 million pesos, in 1965 to 29.6 million pesos and then
decreased slightly in 1966 to 22.3 million pesos. 9 Thus, France had become
an important trading partner at the time of the agreement, a relationship
which Cuba presumably wished not only to maintain but to further
develop. Subsequent to the signing of the French agreement, the trade in
1967 with France more than doubled over the previous year, reaching
56.1 million pesos.40 The willingness of Cuba to consummate an accord
must have been at least a partial impetus to this increased trade, regardless of whether any immediate oral understandings were concluded by the
negotiating parties.
The French accord is additionally distinguishable by its applicability
to all French claimants, in contrast to the limitation of the Swiss accord
to the three nationalized food processing industries. While the French
accord did not include any additional mutual determination of claims as
in the Swiss case, the former accord does indicate that the agreement was
determined "after a bilateral examination of the claims raised by French
persons, natural and juridical. ' ' 41 Such a provision should not be unexpected; no nation agreeing to the payment of a settlement amount for the
taking of foreign property is likely to accept the unilateral declaration
of the claimant nation as to the amount of claims owed. In any future
agreement between Cuba and the United States, Cuba is unlikely to
unquestionably accept as conclusively determinative of the value of the
property expropriated, the approximately $1.8 billion of United States
claims adjudicated by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Little
problem is likely to be created, however. Even though Cuba might successfully challenge many of the claims on such grounds as an inability of the
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Commission to have access to adequate records to support the valuation
of certain properties in Cuba, the $1.8 billion is far in excess of any
conceivable amount which Cuba might be able to pay. Consequently,
reducing the aggregate by even an arbitrary 20 percent for possible overvaluation of property, leaves a total which is still beyond Cuba's ability
to pay. Since any payment from Cuba to the United States is likely to be
more in the range of 10-20 percent of the adjudicated claims amount, any
Cuban desire to critically review each claim would serve little purpose.
The claim records of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, as public
documents, have been accessible to Cuban representatives to examine, and
the conclusion would have to be that although there are obvious questionable valuations, the procedures utilized were generally fair and did not
tend to over-inflate claims. Indeed, many viewers of the adjudication
process suggest that the Commission has been too conservative in its
approach, particularly when valuing business property and evidencing a
reluctance to adopt going concern value approaches which would give
higher final valuations than the Commission's more traditional utilization
of book value methods.
The French accord provided for the payment of 10,861,53 francs
in 12 nearly equal installments over approximately five years. 42 The
method of payment is far simpler than that of the Swiss accord; the
Banco Nacional de Cuba is obligated to make the periodic payments by
transfers to the credit of a special account opened in the Bank of France.
Additional provisions of the brief accord, not unexpected in this form of
agreement, provide for a full release of Cuba upon complete payment of
the agreed upon sum, a guarantee by the French government against
claims of French nationals, a grant to France of exclusive jurisdiction for
the distribution of the funds, free exchange of necessary information and
the settlement of disagreements by mutual negotiations.
A few observations from the Cuban pattern of claims settlement to
date may be drawn from the above information which may have some
applicability on any future settlement of the United States claims. Cuba
was unwilling for nearly seven years to discuss any settlement even with
those European nations which continued some level of trade after the
expropriations of property of their own nationals. Trade statistics, particularly the increase of trade with Spain and France immediately after the
settlement, suggest that Cuba ultimately decided that increased trade with
Europe, although not with the United States, was desirable. The reasons
must include a wish to divert some trade from the Soviet Union in order
both to lessen Cuba's dependence on the Soviets and to obtain needed con-
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vertible foreign exchange. The actual increased trade with France and
Spain, as well as the direct trade provisions in the Swiss accord, additionally illustrate that Cuba has not agreed to any settlement of claims merely
to resolve legitimate claims for property deprivations, but that the settlements are considered as a quid pro quo for the acquisition of needed
commodities or foreign exchange. That the same attitude will be evidenced
in any future bargaining with the United States should be obvious. It is
doubtful that the United States would agree to any accord, however, which
returned to Cuba a substantial sugar quota, or that any sugar sales would
be at a subsidized price.43 Since any settlement with the United States
could only be accomplished through trade-generated foreign exchange, the
manner of payment would most certainly be tied to stipulated trade levels
with the United States, although not necessarily including specific purchase
requirements of particular commodities.
The Cuban delay in negotiating with Canada is not entirely surprising.
After an initial brief but substantial reduction of trade in 1962, Canada
maintained a significant trade volume with Cuba until 1966, when trade
4
again declined to about one-half of the earlier levels.! Cuba's need for
commodities, its sympathy for an increasing Canadian nationalism and
separatism from the United States, and the relative closeness of the Canadian markets, establishes Canada as a market which Cuba would like to
increasingly penetrate. The result could be a further delay in returning
to some trade detente with the United States. As Cuba's trade increases
with other nations of the West which offer substitute commodities for
those previously available only in the United States, the United States will
have a continually diminished bargaining position regarding a resolution
of the outstanding claims. Indeed, Cuba could acquire a unique position
in the world by establishing substantial trade relationships with nearly all
trading nations other than the United States, but maintaining a policy
of no contact with the United States for no reason other than to avoid
resolving the claims settlement issue. There currently appears to be little
which Cuba needs from the United States which cannot be bought in
other available world markets. Settlement agreements with Canadian and
European nations are eased by the relatively small investment in Cuba by
nationals of those areas at the time of the revolution. That portends a
pessimistic approach to using these settlements as a likely precursor to a
United States-Cuban accord. While it is not known what percentage of
total claims Cuba's agreements with other nations have allowed, for a
settlement of even ten percent of the claims adjudicated under the Cuban
Claims Act by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Cuba would

SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN CLAIMS: CUBA

have to agree to pay nearly $200 million. The payment of any percentage
future settlement would have to take place over a long term and be funded
by renewed trade. Little indication of a need to re-establish trade with the
United States is presently apparent. What may bring Cuba back into a
trading relationship with the United States, however, is both the market
proximity and the size of the United States market for Cuban exports.
Whatever future resolution is reached between Cuba and the United
States, the information currently available regarding Cuban settlements
of international claims issues with other nations may be of substantial use
both in identifying the type of agreement that Cuba is willing to consider
and to illustrate those conditions which the Cubans deem mandatory for
any settlement.
The pattern of Cuba's settlements with other nations does not suggest
a Cuban recognition of a right to compensation under either Cuban or
international law, but rather an intention to settle claims as a condition
precedent to the development or continuation of trade patterns with
specific nations. A Cuban settlement with the United States must evolve
from a need which is currently not in evidence. If renewed relation means
increased freedom of access for United States nationals to visit Cuba, and
for journalists and scholars not carefully selected by the Cuban government to visit and report about changes in Cuba, then Cuba may continue
its semi-isolation status from the United States for the indefinite future.
The re-establishment of relations, with renewed trade and some settlement
of the claims issue, currently appears to pose too many problems for a
substantial detente. It will come, but at a slow pace more analogous to the
increasing nexus between the United States and the Peoples' Republic of
China than to recent trade developments with the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. When relations are re-established, further study of the Cuban
approach to the settlement of claims by foreign property owners will be
facilitated. Until then, continued inquiry will be limited to a catch-ascatch-can appraisal of those agreements with individuals and nations which
disclose some of the details of the agreements, implementing procedures
and claims experience.
NOTES

]This argument has apparently not been effective with the Cuban government.

The author has been unable to obtain a Cuban visa to visit the country to study
Cuba's claims agreements and trade attitudes. Reasonably good authority, supported
by the written materials describing recent visits to Cuba, suggests that those who are
allowed to visit Cuba are either long term "Cuba watchers" of clearly proven sym-
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pathies to the revolution, or liberal journalists who know little, if anything, about
Cuba, and who are likely to be satisfied with tours of those areas the Cuban government wishes to have publicized.
2

See note at text 14 infra.

3

The move was apparently overlooked as a forerunner of events to come. The
dollars moved to Canada had more "purchasing power" there, they were less de
minirnus in contrast to Canadian investments in Cuba than investments by United
States nationals.
4

Cuban Assets Control Regulations, July 8, 1963. 31 C.F.R. Pt. 515 (1972).

SThese branches were expropriated, but not under the same law which nationalized United States Banks. See text accompanying notes 179-80 ch. 111, supra.
6

Communiqu6, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, No. 3. Jan. 14,
1971. [hereinafter cited as Communiqui].
7Jd. at 30.
8The Canadian government has not released the aggregate value of the claims.
Claimants were advised to obtain details of the procedures and forms from the
Claims Section of the department. The January 14, 1971 communiqu for filing of
claims contained only a brief reference to standing, stating that:
In, accordance with well-established international rules and practice
in this field, the Canadian Government will be able to take into
consideration only claims in respect of property which belongs to
persons who were Canadian citizens at the time the property was
nationalized or otherwise taken. CommuniquE at 30.
9Letter dated Nov. 23, 1972 to the author from the Legal Advisory Division,
Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.
0

1 Discussions had not yet commenced as of late February, 1973. Letter dated
February 21, 1973 to the author from the Legal Advisory Division, Department of
External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada.
t'U.S. Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba, 11 (1965).
2

1 Cuba, 1968 Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of Latin America 170, table
107 (U.C.L.A. 1970) [hereinafter cited as UCLA report].
lSld. at 170-71.
4

1 Letter dated January 23, 1973 to the author from Minister Counselor Jos6
Maria Allendesalazar, Embassy of Spain, Washington, D.C. relaying instructions from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, Spain.
tSUCLA report 170, table 107.
161d. at 170-71.
t7The Swiss Federal Council, in its report to the Swiss Federal Assembly requesting the approval of the settlement, indicated that Cuba had been unwilling to
discuss the issue with Switzerland until late 1966. See Message du Conseil f~d~ral i
l'Assemblfe fidrale relatif A l'accord entre la ConfEdEration suisse et la Rfpublique
de Cuba concernant l'indemnisation des int6r~ts suisses, 2 [hereinafter cited as Swiss
Message]. Original text supplied the author by the Swiss government. The negotiations were nowhere nearly as lengthy as the waiting period for their commencement;
commenced on February 20, 1967, they were concluded the next month, on March
2nd. The Swiss government was additionally acting on behalf of nationals of
Liechtenstein.
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tsWeston suggests that the French-Cuban agreement may not have been conditioned upon France's acceding to a trade agreement. B. Weston International Claims;
Post-war French Practice 33 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Weston]. While no agreement was directly tied to the accord, the trade pattern of Cuba and France implies
that the accord was prompted by the prospect of a continued favorable trade
relationship.
19Accord entre le Gouvernement de la Conffderation suisse et le Gouvernement
Rfvolutionnaire de Ia Ripublique de Cuba concernant l'indemnisation des biens,
droits and intfr8ts suisse touchis par les lois promulgutes par le Gouvernement
Rfvolutionaire de Ia Ripublique de Cuba A partir du ler janvier 1959 [hereinafter
cited as Swiss Accord]. Original text supplied the author by the Swiss government.
20Swiss Accord, art. 1. The three companies were the Compafiia Nacional do
Alimentos, S.A., Latas Modernas, S.A., and Conservas Selectas, S.A., all absorbed
by the most encompassing of the Cuban expropriatory decrees, which nationalized
nearly all remaining foreign owned property on the island.
211d. arts. 1, 2. Payment in Swiss francs rather than pesos was obviously a
non-negotiable demand of the Swiss, the Cuban pesos having rapidly achieved a
state of inconvertibility in world markets after the revolution. The need to use the
franc as a measure of payment was further suggested by the Swiss agreement to
installment compensation; the peso was subject to artificial support and was an
unreliable currency for future payments.
221d. art. 2. The compensation payments have been made with "exemplary punctuality." Letter dated June 7, 1973 to the author from the Department Politique
Ffderal, Bern, Switzerland.
23Swiss Message at 2.
24d. at 3.
25

Swiss Accord art. 3.

261f the additional purchase of coffee allowed the full indemnification amount
to be paid in less than eight years, the Swiss interests nevertheless remained committed to the annual purchase of 40,000 tons of sugar.
271d. The Accord does not define what delays might be acceptable. Were Cuba
to overcommit itself to sugar export contracts, Swiss priority would seem low since
Cuba would want to first supply nations offering needed foreign exchange or commodities, without the deduction for indemnities required with sales to the Swiss
interests.
2
8Ley 851, 6 Jul. 19, Gaceta Oficial, 7 Jul. 1960. See text accompanying notes
108-115, ch. IV, supra.
29
1t is difficult to predict whether Switzerland's international status as a financial
center and reputation as a peaceful and admired neutral, encouraged the settlement;
the terms of the agreement would suggest that this probably had very little effect.

30 Swiss Message at 3.
31Swiss Accord art. 4.
32d. art. 6.
3
3Avis-Announce des biens, des crdances et des intfr6ts suisses i Cuba. April
13, 1967. Original text supplied the author by the Swiss government.
34

See Weston at 61 n. 235.

35Decree No. 67-853 of September 20, 1967 [1967] J.O. 9761, Oct. 4, 1967. [1967]
[hereinafter cited as the French Accord]. The Accord is translated in Weston at 193.
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36UCLA report at 170, table 107.
37Id.
3

8See the text accompanying notes 12-16, supra.

39UCLA report at 170-171, table 107.
40d. at 170, table 107.
41lFrench Accord at preamble.
42

French Accord, art. 2. The 10,861,532 French francs using exchange rates prevailing in March 1967, was equivalent to approximately $2,170,000. The Swiss Accord
total of 18,039,000 Swiss francs, also applying March, 1967 exchange valuations,
equalled about $4,140,000.
431f a subsidized price is utilized to provide for an indemnification fund, the
result is a United States taxpayer indemnification of the United States claimants.
44UCLA report at 170, table 107.

